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Not A Football Podcast 10: Hellspawn of the Big Ten West
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Not A Football Podcast 10: Hellspawn of the Big Ten West

Britt, Grace, Jesse, and Kellin all get to luxuriate in the chaos after Alabama's playoff hopes crumble; in today's newsletter, Roger Cormier implores the football world to ditch analytics... sort of

Screw It, Always Go For 2

By Roger Cormier

It's funny how in football, "analytics" is just another way of saying "go for it, coward" and "pretend your kicker doesn't exist." It's funny and it's true, which is even better. 

College football is where gimmicks go to die, but aggressively eschewing the kicking game has made it to the NFL. That doesn't mean the NCAA universe still doesn't bang its head against the wall when playing the percentages doesn't happen to work out.

In Alabama's loss to LSU over the weekend, Nick Saban went for two when up 15-14 and 21-17 in the fourth quarter. The Crimson Tide failed to convert both times. Saban was questioned about going for two afterwards, and the coaching legend resorted to wryly asking if the reporters wanted to see the chart he consulted that told him to do that. Here's the thing, and I kind of hate to say it: Nick Saban is right. If you're up one late in the game, you wanna be up three instead of two, and you wanna be up six instead of five. Where Saban screwed up probably is not being more innovative in drawing up two-point plays. Twisting the knife, LSU won when Brian Kelly and his totally normal accent went for two in overtime instead of conventionally tying it up to force a second OT, and succeeded. Brian Kelly didn't have to offer to show his chart because he won the damn thing.

Dave Pasch is usually an intelligent play-by-play man for ESPN, but perhaps his years having to deal with Bill Walton have dulled his brain synapses. He was totally confused late Saturday night when California went for two after scoring a touchdown to lower their deficit to USC to 8. For years now, football fans have gotten to know the strategy of going for two when down a touchdown late. The thinking makes a lot of sense: if you go for two and make it, then you're only down six, and if you score another touchdown and kick an extra point, holy moly, you're up one instead of tied, and don't have to potentially deal with overtime when anything goes. If you go for two and don't make it, hey that's cool: you can just go for two again if you score another touchdown to tie it up. Theoretically, you can wait to go for two to avoid a tie after the second touchdown, but defenses still presumably are more prepared for that possibility, and there's maybe less pressure on your offense doing it the fun way. (For what it's worth, Cal made the conversion but didn't score again, losing by six instead of seven.)

The problem that suffocated baseball last decade is an annoyance in football today: veteran players griping about "analytics". They grew up believing going for two was only done in an emergency and going for it on fourth down in the middle of the field was something Bill Belichick infamously tried once in an AFC Championship Game and failed in, lesson learned. They equate "analytics" to 3D chess. It's a branding problem. If the powers that be simply called it "being aggressive" instead of "analytics" there would be much less griping. Because that what it is: being aggressive. Putting pressure on the defense. Trusting your quarterback. You know, the pillars of American values. 

And now, bonus cover art!

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